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Abstract
Form a privacy perspective most concerns against the common use of biometrics arise from the storage and
misuse of biometric data. Biometric cryptosystems and cancelable biometrics represent emerging technologies of
biometric template protection addressing these concerns and improving public confidence and acceptance of
biometrics. In addition, biometric cryptosystems provide mechanisms for biometric-dependent key-release. In the
last years a significant amount of approaches to both technologies have been published. A comprehensive survey
of biometric cryptosystems and cancelable biometrics is presented. State-of-the-art approaches are reviewed based
on which an in-depth discussion and an outlook to future prospects are given.
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1. Introduction
The term biometrics is defined as “automated recogni-
tion of individuals based on their behavioral and biologi-
cal characteristics“ (ISO/IEC JTC1 SC37). Physiological
as well as behavioral biometric characteristics are
acquired applying adequate sensors and distinctive fea-
tures are extracted to form a biometric template in an
enrollment process. At the time of verification or identi-
fication (identification can be handled as a sequence of
verifications and screenings) the system processes
another biometric input which is compared against the
stored template, yielding acceptance or rejection [1]. It
is generally conceded that a substitute to biometrics for
positive identification in integrated security applications
is non-existent. While the industry has long claimed
that one of the primary benefits of biometric templates
is that original biometric signals acquired to enroll a
data subject cannot be reconstructed from stored tem-
plates, several approaches [2,3] have proven this claim
wrong. Since biometric characteristics are largely immu-
table, a compromise of biometric templates results in
permanent loss of a subject’s biometrics. Standard
encryption algorithms do not support a comparison of
biometric templates in encrypted domain and, thus,
leave biometric templates exposed during every
authentication attempt [4] (homomorphic and asym-
metric encryption, e.g., in [5-7], which enable a bio-
metric comparison in encrypted domain represent
exceptions). Conventional cryptosystems provide numer-
ous algorithms to secure any kind of crucial informa-
tion. While user authentication is based on possession
of secret keys, key management is performed introdu-
cing a second layer of authentication (e.g., passwords)
[8]. As a consequence, encrypted data inherit the secur-
ity of according passwords applied to release correct
decrypting keys. Biometric template protection schemes
which are commonly categorized as biometric cryptosys-
tems (also referred to as helper data-based schemes) and
cancelable biometrics (also referred to as feature trans-
formation) are designed to meet two major require-
ments of biometric information protection (ISO/IEC
FCD 24745):
• Irreversibility: It should be computationally hard to
reconstruct the original biometric template from the
stored reference data, i.e., the protected template,
while it should be easy to generate the protected
biometric template.
• Unlinkability: Different versions of protected bio-
metric templates can be generated based on the
same biometric data (renewability), while protected
templates should not allow cross-matching
(diversity).
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“Biometric cryptosystems (BCSs) are designed to
securely bind a digital key to a biometric or generate a
digital key from a biometric“ [9] offering solutions to
biometric-dependent key-release and biometric template
protection [10,11]. Replacing password-based key-
release, BCSs brings about substantial security benefits.
It is significantly more difficult to forge, copy, share, and
distribute biometrics compared to passwords [1]. Most
biometric characteristics provide an equal level of secur-
ity across a user-group (physiological biometric charac-
teristics are not user selected). Due to biometric
variance (see Figure 1), conventional biometric systems
perform “fuzzy comparisons” by applying decision
thresholds which are set up based on score distributions
between genuine and non-genuine subjects. In contrast,
BCSs are designed to output stable keys which are
required to match a 100% at authentication. Original
biometric templates are replaced through biometric-
dependent public information which assists the key-
release process.
“Cancelable biometrics (CB) consist of intentional,
repeatable distortions of biometric signals based on
transforms which provide a comparison of biometric tem-
plates in the transformed domain“ [12]. The inversion of
such transformed biometric templates must not be feasi-
ble for potential imposters. In contrast to templates pro-
tected by standard encryption algorithms, transformed
templates are never decrypted since the comparison of
biometric templates is performed in transformed space
which is the very essence of CB. The application of
transforms provides irreversibility and unlinkability of
biometric templates [9]. Obviously, CB are closely
related to BCSs.
As both technologies have emerged rather recently
and corresponding literature is dispersed across different
publication media, a systematic classification and in-
depth discussion of approaches to BCS and CB is given.
As opposed to existing literature [4,8], which intends to
review BCSs and CB at coarse level, this article provides
the reader with detailed descriptions of all existing key
concepts and follow-up developments. Emphasis is not
only placed on biometric template protection but on
cryptographic aspects. Covering the vast majority of
published approaches up to and including the year 2010
this survey comprises a valuable collection of references
based on which a detailed discussion (including perfor-
mance rates, applied data sets, etc.) of the state-of-the-
art technologies is presented and a critical analysis of
open issues and challenges is given.
This survey is organized as follows: BCSs (Section 2)
and CB (Section 3) are categorized and concerning lit-
erature is reviewed in detail. A comprehensive discus-
sion including the current state-of-the-art approaches to
both technologies, security risks, privacy aspects, and
open issues and challenges is presented and concluding
remarks are given (Section 4).
2. Biometric Cryptosystems
The majority of BCSs require the storage of biometric-
dependent public information, applied to retrieve or
generate keys, which is referred to as helper data [4].
Due to biometric variance it is not feasible for most bio-
metric characteristics to extract keys directly. Helper
data, which must not reveal significant information
about original biometric templates, assists in recon-
structing keys. Biometric comparisons are performed
indirectly by verifying key validities, where the output of
an authentication process is either a key or a failure
message. Since the verification of keys represents a bio-
metric comparison in encrypted domain [11], BCSs are
applied as a means of biometric template protection [4],
in addition to providing biometric-dependent key-
release. Based on how helper data are derived, BCSs
are classified as key-binding or key-generation systems
(see Figure 2):
(1) Key-binding schemes: Helper data are obtained by
binding a chosen key to a biometric template. As a
result of the binding process a fusion of the secret
key and the biometric template is stored as helper
data. Applying an appropriate key retrieval algo-
rithm, keys are obtained from the helper data at
authentication [8]. Since cryptographic keys are
independent of biometric features these are revoc-
able while an update of the key usually requires re-
enrollment in order to generate new helper data.
(2) Key-generation schemes: Helper data are derived
only from the biometric template. Keys are directly
generated from the helper data and a given biometric
sample [4]. While the storage of helper data are not
obligatory the majority of proposed key-generation
schemes does store helper data (if key-generation
Figure 1 Biometric variance (images taken from FVC’04 and
CASIAv3-interval database).
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schemes extract keys without the use of any helper
data these are not updatable in case of compromise).
Helper data-based key-generation schemes are also
referred to as “fuzzy extractors” or “secure sketches”,
for both primitives formalisms (and further exten-
sions) are defined in [13,14]. A fuzzy extractor reliably
extracts a uniformly random string from a biometric
input while stored helper data assist the reconstruc-
tion. In contrast, in a secure sketch, helper data are
applied to recover the original biometric template.
Several concepts of BCSs can be applied as both, key-
generation and key-binding scheme [15,16]. Hybrid
approaches which make use of more basic concepts [17]
have been proposed, too. Furthermore, schemes which
declare different goals such as enhancing the security of
an existing secret [18,19] have been introduced. In con-
trast to BCSs based on key-binding or key-generation,
key-release schemes represent a loose coupling of
biometric authentication and key-release [8]. In case of
successful biometric authentication a key-release
mechanism is initiated, i.e., a cryptographic key is
released. The loose coupling of biometric and crypto-
graphic systems allows to exchange both components
easily. However, a great drawback emerges, since the
separate plain storage of biometric templates and keys
offers more vulnerabilities to conduct attacks. Key-
release schemes do not meet requirements of biometric
template protection and, thus, are hardly appropriate for
high security applications and not usually considered a
BCS. Another way to classify BCSs is to focus on how
these systems deal with biometric variance. While some
schemes apply error correction codes [15,16], others
introduce adjustable filter functions and correlation [20]
or quantization [21,22].
Even though definitions for “biometric keys” have
been proposed (e.g., in [23,24]), these terms have estab-
lished as synonyms for any kind of key dependent upon
biometrics, i.e., biometric features take influence on the
constitution of keys (as opposed to key-binding
schemes). Like conventional cryptographic keys, bio-
metric keys have to fulfill several requirements, such as
key-randomness, stability, or uniqueness [25,26].
A. Performance measurement
When measuring the performance of biometric systems
widely used factors include False Rejection Rate (FRR),
False Acceptance Rate (FAR), and Equal Error Rate
(EER) [1,27] (defined in ISO/IEC FDIS 19795-1). As
score distributions overlap, FRR and FAR intersect at a
certain point, defining the EER of the system (in general,
decreasing the FRR increases the FAR and vice versa).
These performance metrics are directly transferred to
key-release schemes. In the context of BCSs the mean-
ing of these metrics change since threshold-based “fuzzy
comparison” is eliminated. Within BCSs acceptance
requires the generation or retrieval of hundred percent
correct keys, while conventional biometric systems
response with “Yes” or “No”. The fundamental differ-
ence between performance measurement in biometric
systems and BCSs is illustrated in Figure 3. The FRR of
a BCS defines the rate of incorrect keys untruly gener-
ated by the system, that is, the percentage of incorrect
keys returned to genuine users (correct keys are user-
specific and associated with according helper data). By
analogy, the FAR defines the rate of correct keys untruly
generated by the system, that is, the percentage of cor-
rect keys returned to non-genuine users. A false accept
corresponds to the an untrue generation or retrieval of
keys associated with distinct helper data at enrollment.
Compared to biometric systems, BCSs generally reveal
a noticeable decrease in recognition performance [8].
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Figure 3 Performance measurement in (a) biometric systems
and (b) BCSs.
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template is not seen and, therefore, cannot be aligned
properly at comparison. In addition, the majority of
BCSs introduce a higher degree of quantization at fea-
ture extraction, compared to conventional biometric sys-
tems, which are capable of setting more precise
thresholds to adjust recognition rates.
B. Approaches to biometric key-binding
1) Mytec1 and Mytec2 (Biometric Encryption™)
The first sophisticated approach to biometric key-bind-
ing based on fingerprints was proposed by Soutar et al.
[28-30]. The presented system was called Mytec2, a suc-
cessor of Mytec1 [20], which was the first BCS but
turned out to be impractical in terms of accuracy and
security. Mytec1 and Mytec2 were originally called Bio-
metric Encryption™, the trademark was abandoned in
2005. The basis of the Mytec2 (and Mytec1) algorithm
is the mechanism of correlation.
Operation mode (see Figure 4): at enrollment a filter
function, H(u), is derived from f0(x), which is a two-
dimensional image array (0 indicates the first measure-
ment). Subsequently, a correlation function c(x) between
f0(x) and any other biometric input f1(x) obtained during
verification is defined by c(x) = FT−1{F1(u)F∗0(u)} ,
which is the inverse Fourier transform of the product of
the Fourier transform of a biometric input, denoted by
F1(u), and F
∗
0(u) , where F
∗
0(u) is represented by H(u).
The output c(x) is an array of scalar values describing
the degree of similarity. To provide distortion tolerance,
the filter function is calculated using a set of T training
images {f 10 (x), f 20 (x), . . . , f T0 (x)} . The output pattern of
f t0(x) is denoted by c
t
0(x) with its Fourier transform
Ft0(u)H(u) . The complex conjugate of the phase com-
ponent of H(u), eij(H(u)), is multiplied with a random
phase-only array of the same size to create a secure fil-
ter, Hstored(u), which is stored as part of the template
while the magnitude of H(u) is discarded. The output
pattern c0(x) is then linked with an N-bit cryptographic
key k0 using a linking algorithm: if the n-th bit of k0 is 0
then L locations of the selected part of c0(x) which are 0
are chosen and the indices of the locations are written
into the n-th column of a look-up table which is stored
as part of the template, termed BioScrypt. During link-
ing, redundancy is added by applying a repetitive code.
Standard hashing algorithms are used to compute a
hash of k0, termed id0 which is stored as part of the
template, too. During authentication a set of biometric
images is combined with Hstored(u) to produce an output
pattern c1(x). With the use of the look-up table an
appropriate retrieval algorithm calculates an N-bit key
k1 extracting the constituent bits of the binarized output
pattern. Finally, a hash id1 is calculated and tested
against id0 to check the validity of k1.
The algorithm was summarized in a patent [31],
which includes explanations of how to apply the algo-
rithm to other biometric characteristics such as iris. In
all the publications, performance measurements are
omitted.
2) Fuzzy commitment scheme
In 1999 Juels and Wattenberg [15] combined techniques
from the area of error correcting codes and cryptogra-
phy to achieve a type of cryptographic primitive referred
to as fuzzy commitment scheme.
Operation mode (see Figure 5): A fuzzy commitment
scheme consists of a function F, used to commit a code-
word c Î C and a witness x Î {0, 1}n. The set C is a set
of error correcting codewords c of length n and x repre-
sents a bitstream of length n, termed witness (biometric
data). The difference vector of c and x, δ Î {0, 1}n, where
x = c + δ, and a hash value h(c) are stored as the com-
mitment termed F(c, x) (helper data). Each x’, which is
sufficiently “close” to x, according to an appropriate
metric, should be able to reconstruct c using the differ-
ence vector δ to translate x’ in the direction of x. A hash
of the result is tested against h(c). With respect to bio-
metric key-binding the system acquires a witness x at
enrollment, selects a codeword c Î C, calculates and
stores the commitment F(c, x) (δ and h(c)). At the time
of authentication, a witness x’ is acquired and the system
checks whether x’ yields a successful decommitment.
Proposed schemes (see Table 1): The fuzzy commit-
ment scheme was applied to iris-codes by Hao et al.
















































Figure 4 Mytec1 and Mytec2: basic operation mode.
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bind and retrieve 140-bit cryptographic keys prepared
with Hadamard and Reed-Solomon error correction
codes. Hadamard codes are applied to eliminate bit
errors originating from the natural biometric variance
and Reed-Solomon codes are applied to correct burst
errors resulting from distortions. The system was tested
with 700 iris images of 70 probands obtaining rather
impressive results which were not achieved until then.
In order to provide an error correction decoding in an
iris-based fuzzy commitment scheme, which gets close
to a theoretical bound, two-dimensional iterative min-
sum decoding is introduced by Bringer et al. [33,34].
Within this approach a matrix is created where lines as
well as columns are formed by two different binary
Reed-Muller codes. Thereby a more efficient decoding is
available. The proposed scheme was adapted to the
standard iris recognition algorithm of Daugman to bind
and retrieve 40-bit keys. Due to the fact that this
scheme was tested on non-ideal iris images a more sig-
nificant performance evaluation is provided. Rathgeb
and Uhl [35] provide a systematic approach to the con-
struction of iris-based fuzzy commitment schemes. After
analyzing error distributions between iris-codes of differ-
ent iris recognition algorithms, Reed-Solomon and
Hardamard codes are applied (similar to [32]). In other
further work [36] the authors apply context-based reli-
able component selection in order to extract keys from
iris-codes which are then bound to Hadamard code-
words. Different techniques to improve the performance
of iris-based fuzzy commitment schemes have been pro-
posed [37-39]. Binary iris-codes are suitable to be
applied in a fuzzy commitment scheme, in addition,
template alignment is still feasible since it only involves
a one-dimensional circular shift of a given iris-code.
Besides iris, the fuzzy commitment scheme has been
applied to other biometrics as well, which always
requires a binarization of extracted feature vectors.
Teoh and Kim [40] applied a randomized dynamic
quantization transformation to binarize fingerprint
features extracted from a multichannel Gabor filter.
Feature vectors of 375 bits are extracted and Reed-
Solomon codes are applied to construct the fuzzy
commitment scheme. The transformation comprises a
non-invertible projection based on a random matrix
derived from a user-specific token. It is required that
this token is stored on a secure device. Similar schemes
based on the feature extraction of BioHashing [41]
(discussed later) have been presented in [42,43]. Tong
et al. [44] proposed a fuzzy extractor scheme based on
a stable and order invariant representation of biometric
data called Fingercode reporting inapplicable perfor-
mance rates. Nandakumar [45] applies a binary fixed-
length minutiae representation obtained by quantizing
the Fourier phase spectrum of a minutia set in a fuzzy
commitment scheme, where alignment is achieved
through focal point of high curvature regions. In [46] a
fuzzy commitment scheme based on face biometrics is
presented in which real-valued face features are binar-
ized by simple thresholding followed by a reliable bit
selection to detect most discriminative features. Lu
et al. [47] binarized principal component analysis
(PCA) based face features which they apply in a fuzzy
commitment scheme.
A method based on user adaptive error correction
codes was proposed by Maiorana et al. [48] where the
error correction information is adaptively selected based
on the intra-variability of a user’s biometric data. Apply-
ing online signatures this seems to be the first approach
of using behavioral biometrics in a fuzzy commitment
scheme. In [49] another fuzzy commitment scheme
based on online signatures is presented.
While in classic fuzzy commitment schemes [15,32]
biometric variance is eliminated applying error correc-
tion codes, Zheng et al. [50] employ error tolerant lat-
tice functions. In experiments a FRR of ~3.3% and a
FAR of ~0.6% are reported. Besides the formalism of
fuzzy extractors and secure sketches, Dodis et al. [13]
introduce the so-called syndrome construction. Here an
error correction code syndrome is stored as part of the
template and applied during authentication in order to
reconstruct the original biometric input.
3) Shielding functions
Tuyls et al. [51] introduced a concept which is referred
to as shielding functions.
Operation mode (see Figure 6): It is assumed that at
enrollment a noise-free real-valued biometric feature
vector X of fixed length is available. This feature vector
is used together with a secret S (the key) to generate the
helper data W applying an inverse δ-contracting func-
tion G-1, such that G(W, X) = S. Like in the fuzzy com-
mitment scheme [15], additionally, a hash F(S) = V of
the secret S is stored. The core of the scheme is the
δ-contracting function G which calculates a residual for
Table 1 Experimental results of proposed fuzzy
commitment schemes.
Authors Char. FRR/FAR Remarks
Hao et al. [32] 0.47/0 Ideal images
Bringer et al. [34] Iris 5.62/0 Short key
Rathgeb and Uhl [39] 4.64/0 -
Teoh and Kim [40] 0.9/0 User-specific tokens
Tong et al. [44] Fingerprint 78/0.1 -
Nandakumar [45] 12.6/0 -
Van der Veen et al. [46] 3.5/0 >1 enroll. sam.
Ao and Li [43] Face 7.99/0.11 -
Lu et al. [47] ~30/0 Short key
Maiorana and Ercole [48] Online Sig. 13.07/4 >1 enroll. sam.
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each feature, which is the distance to the center of the
nearest even-odd or odd-even interval, depending on
whether the corresponding bit of S is 0 or 1. W can be
seen as correction vector which comprises all residuals.
At authentication another biometric feature vector Y is
obtained and G(W, Y) is calculated. In case ||X - Y|| ≤
δ, G(W, Y) = S’ = S = G(W, X). In other words, noisy
features are added to the stored residuals and the result-
ing vector is decoded. An additional application of error
correction is optional. Finally, the hash value F(S’) of the
reconstructed secret S’ is tested against the previously
stored one (V) yielding successful authentication or
rejection. In further work [52] the authors extract reli-
able components from fingerprints reporting a FRR of
0.054% and a FAR of 0.032%.
Buhan et al. [53] extend the ideas of the shielding
functions approach by introducing a feature mapping
based on hexagonal zones instead of square zones. No
results in terms of FRR and FAR are given. Li et al. [54]
suggest to apply fingerprint in a key-binding scheme
based on shielding functions.
4) Fuzzy vault
One of the most popular BCSs called fuzzy vault was
introduced by Juels and Sudan [16] in 2002.
Operation mode (see Figure 7): The key idea of the
fuzzy vault scheme is to use an unordered set A to lock
a secret key k, yielding a vault, denoted by VA. If
another set B overlaps largely with A, k is reconstructed,
i.e., the vault VA is unlocked. The vault is created apply-
ing polynomial encoding and error correction. During
the enrollment phase a polynom p is selected which
encodes the key k in some way (e.g., the coefficients of
p are formed by k), denoted by p ¬ k. Subsequently, the
elements of A are projected onto the polynom p, i.e., p
(A) is calculated. Additionally, chaff points are added in
order to obscure genuine points of the polynom. The
set of all points, R, forms the template. To achieve suc-
cessful authentication another set B needs to overlap
with A to a certain extent in order to locate a sufficient
amount of points in R that lie on p. Applying error cor-
rection codes, p can be reconstructed and, thus, k. The
security of the whole scheme lies within the infeasibility
of the polynomial reconstruction and the number of
applied chaff points. The main advantage of this concept
is the feature of order invariance, i.e., fuzzy vaults are
able to cope with unordered feature set which is the
case for several biometric characteristics (e.g., finger-
prints [27]).
Proposed schemes (see Table 2): Clancy et al. [55] pro-
posed the first practical and most apparent implementa-
tion of the fuzzy vault scheme by locking minutiae
points in a “fingerprint vault”. A set of minutiae points,
A, are mapped onto a polynom p and chaff points are
randomly added to construct the vault. During authenti-
cation, Reed-Solomon codes are applied to reconstruct
the polynom p out of which a 128-bit key is recreated.
An pre-alignment of fingerprints is assumed which is
rarely the case in practice (feature alignment represents
a fundamental step in conventional fingerprint recogni-
tion systems). To overcome the assumption of pre-align-
ment, Nandakumar et al. [56] suggest to utilize high
curvature points derived from the orientation field of a
fingerprint as helper data to assist the process of align-
ment. In their fingerprint fuzzy vault, 128-bit keys are
bound and retrieved. Uludag et al. [8,57,58] propose a
line-based minutiae representation which the authors
evaluate on a test set of 450 fingerprint pairs. Several
other approaches have been proposed to improve the
alignment within fingerprint-based fuzzy vaults [59-61].
Rotation and translation invariant minutiae representa-
tions have been suggested in [62].
Numerous enhancements to the original concept of
the fuzzy vault have been introduced. Moon et al. [63]
suggest to use an adaptive degree of the polynomial.
Nagar and Chaudhury [64] arrange encoded keys and
biometric data of fingerprints in the same order into
separate grids, which form the vault. Chaff values are
inserted into these grids in appropriate range to hide
information.
In other work, Nagar et al. [17,65] introduce the idea
of enhancing the security and accuracy of a fingerprint-
based fuzzy vault by exploiting orientation information
of minutiae points. Dodis et al. [13] suggest to use a
high-degree polynomial instead of chaff points in order
to create an improved fuzzy vault. Additionally, the
authors propose another syndrome-based key-generating
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Figure 7 Fuzzy vault scheme: basic operation mode.
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based on polynomial interpolation like the fuzzy vault
but requires less storage space. Arakala [66] provides an
implementation of the PinSketch scheme based on
fingerprints.
Apart from fingerprints, other biometric characteris-
tics have been applied in fuzzy vault schemes. Lee et
al. [67] proposed a fuzzy vault for iris biometrics.
Since iris features are usually aligned, an unordered set
of features is obtained through independent compo-
nent analysis. Wu et al. [68,69] proposed a fuzzy vault
based on iris as well. After image acquisition and pre-
processing, iris texture is divided into 64 blocks where
for each block the mean gray scale value is calculated
resulting in 256 features which are normalized to inte-
gers to reduce noise. At the same time, a Reed-Solo-
mon code is generated and, subsequently, the feature
vector is translated to a cipher key using a hash func-
tion. In further work, Wu et al. [70] propose a system
based on palmprints in which 362 bit cryptographic
keys are bound and retrieved. A similar approach
based on face biometrics is presented in [71]. PCA fea-
tures are quantized to obtain a 128-bit feature vector
from which 64 distinguishable bits are indexed in a
look-up table while variance is overcome by Reed-
Solomon codes. Reddy and Babu [72] enhance the
security of a classic fuzzy vault scheme based on iris
by adding a password with which the vault as well as
the secret key is hardened. In case passwords are com-
promised the systems security decreases to that of a
standard one, thus, according results were achieved
under unrealistic preconditions. Kumar and Kumar
[73,74] present a fuzzy vault based on palmprints by
employing real-valued DCT coefficients of palmprint
images binding and retrieving 307 bit keys. Kholmatov
and Yanikoglu [75] propose a fuzzy vault for online
signatures.
C. Approaches to biometric key-generation
The prior idea of generating keys directly out of bio-
metric templates was presented in a patent by Bodo
[76]. An implementation of this scheme does not exist
and it is expected that most biometric characteristics do
not provide enough information to reliably extract a suf-
ficiently long and updatable key without the use of any
helper data.
1) Private template scheme
The private template scheme, based on iris, was pro-
posed by Davida et al. [77,78] in which the biometric
template itself (or a hash value of it) serves as a secret
key. The storage of helper data which are error correc-
tion check bits are required to correct faulty bits of
given iris-codes.
Operation mode (see Figure 8): In the enrollment pro-
cess M, 2048-bit iris-codes are generated which are put
through a majority decoder to reduce the Hamming dis-
tance between them. The majority decoder computes
the vector V ec(V) = (V1, V2, ..., Vn) for a n-bit code vec-
tor, denoted by V ec(vi) = (vi,1, vi,2, ..., vi,n), where Vj =
majority(v1,j, v2,j, ..., vM,j) is the majority of 0’s and 1’s at
each bit position j of M vectors. A majority decoded
iris-code T, denoted by V ec(T), is concatenated with
check digits V ec(C), to generate V ec(T)||V ec(C). The
check digits V ec(C) are part of an error correction
code. Subsequently, a hash value Hash (Name, Attr, V
ec(T)||V ec(C)) is generated, where Name is the user’s
name, Attr are public attributes of the user and Hash(·)
is a hash function. Finally, an authorization officer signs
this hash resulting in Sig(Hash(Name, Attr, V ec(T)||V
ec(C))). During authentication, several iris-codes are cap-
tured and majority decoded resulting in V ec(T’). With
the according helper data, V ec(C), the corrected tem-
plate V ec(T“) is reconstructed. Hash(Name, Attr, V ec
(T“)||V ec(C)) is calculated and compared against Sig
(Hash(Name, Attr, V ec(T“)||V ec(C))). Experimental
results are omitted and it is commonly expected that
the proposed system reveals poor performance due to
the fact that the authors restrict to the assumption that
only 10% of bits of an iris-code change among different
Table 2 Experimental results of proposed fuzzy vault
schemes.
Authors Char. FRR/FAR Remarks
Clancy et al. [55] 20-30/0 Pre-alignment
Nandakumar et al. [56] 4/0.04 -
Uludag et al. [57] Fingerprint 27/0 -
Li et al. [61] ~7/0 Alignment-free
Nagar et al. [17] 5/0.01 Hybrid BCS
Lee et al. [67] 0.775/0 -
Wu et al. [68] Iris 5.55/0 -
Reddy and Babu et al. [72] 9.8/0 Hardend vault
Wu et al. [70] 0.93/0 -
Palmprint
Kumar and Kumar [73] ~1/0.3 -
Wu et al. [71] Face 8.5/0 -




























Figure 8 Private template scheme: basic operation mode.
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iris images of a single subject. In general, average intra-
class distances of iris-codes lie within 20-30%. Imple-
mentations of the proposed majority decoding technique
(e.g., in [79]) were not found to decrease intra-class dis-
tances to that extent.
2) Quantization schemes
Within this group of schemes, helper data are con-
structed in a way that is assists in a quantization of bio-
metric features in order to obtain stable keys.
Operation mode (see Figure 9): In general quantization
schemes, which have been applied to physiological as
well as behavioral biometric characteristics, process fea-
ture vectors out of several enrollment samples and
derive appropriate intervals for each feature element
(real-valued feature vectors are required). These inter-
vals are encoded and stored as helper data. At the time
of authentication, again, biometric characteristics of a
subject are measured and mapped into the previously
defined intervals, generating a hash or key. In order to
provide updateable keys or hashes, most schemes pro-
vide a parameterized encoding of intervals. Quantization
schemes are highly related to shielding functions [51]
since both techniques perform quantization of biometric
features by constructing appropriate feature intervals. In
contrast to the shielding functions, generic quantization
schemes define intervals for each single biometric fea-
ture based on its variance. This yields an improved
adjustment of the stored helper data to the nature of
the applied biometrics.
Proposed schemes (see Table 3): Feng and Wah [21]
proposed a quantization scheme applied to online signa-
tures in order to generate 40-bit hashes. To match sig-
natures, dynamic time warping is applied to x and y-
coordinates and shapes of x, y waveforms of a test sam-
ple are aligned with the enrollment sample to extract
correlation coefficients where low ones indicate a rejec-
tion. Subsequently, feature boundaries are defined and
encoded with integers. If a biometric sample passed the
shape-matching stage, extracted features are fitted into
boundaries and a hash is returned out of which a public
and a private key are generated. Vielhauer et al. [22,24]
process online signatures to generate signature hashes,
too. In their approach an interval matrix is generated
for each subject such that hashes are generated by map-
ping every single feature against the interval matrix. In
[80] the authors adopt the proposed feature extraction
to an online signature hash generation based on a
secure sketch. Authors report a decrease of the FRR but
not of the EER. An evaluation of quantization-based
key-generation schemes is given in [81]. Sutcu et al. [82]
proposed a quantization scheme in which hash values
are created out of face biometrics. Li et al. [83] study
how to build secure sketches for asymmetric representa-
tions based on fingerprint biometrics. Furthermore, the
authors propose a theoretical approach to a secure
sketch applying two-level quantization to overcome
potential pre-image attacks [84]. In [85] the proposed
technique is applied to face biometrics. Rathgeb and Uhl
[86] extended the scheme of [82] to iris biometrics gen-
erating 128-bit keys. In [87] the authors apply a con-
text-based reliable component selection and construct
intervals for the most reliable features of each subject.
D. Further investigations on BCSs
Besides the so far described key concepts of BCSs, other
approaches have been proposed. While some represent
combinations of basic concepts, others serve different
purposes. In addition, multi-BCSs have been suggested.
1) Password hardening
Monrose et al. [19] proposed a technique to improve the
security of password-based applications by incorporating
biometric information into the password (an existing
password is “salted” with biometric data).
Operation mode (see Figure 10): The keystroke
dynamics of a user a are combined with a password
pwda resulting in a hardened password hpwda which
can be tested for login purposes or used as crypto-
graphic key. j(a, l) denotes a single biometric feature j
acquired during the l-th login attempt of user a. To
initialize an account, hpwda is chosen at random and
2m shares of hpwda, denoted by {S0t , S1t } , 1 ≤ t ≤ m, are
created by applying Shamir’s secret-sharing scheme. For
each b ∈ {0, 1}
a
m the shares {Sb(t)t } , 1 ≤ t ≤ m, can be
used to reconstruct hpwda, where b(i) is the i-th bit of






















Figure 9 Quantization scheme: basic operation mode.
Table 3 Experimental results of proposed quantization
schemes.
Authors Char. FRR/FAR Remarks
Feng and Wah [21] 28/1.2
Online Sig.
Vielhauer et al. [22] 7.05/0
Li et al. [83] Fingerprint 20/1 >1 enroll. sam.
Sutcu et al. [85] Face 5.5/0
Rathgeb and Uhl [87] Iris 4.91/0
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dimension 2 × m where each element is encrypted with
pwda. During the l-th login, pwd’a, a given password to
access account a, is used to decrypt these elements (the
correctness of pwd’a is necessary but not sufficient). For
each feature ji, comparing the value of ji(a, l) to a
threshold ti Î ℝ indicates which of the two values
should be chosen to reconstruct hpwda. Central to this
scheme is the notion of distinguishable features: let μai
be the mean deviation and sai be the standard deviation
of the measurement ji(a, j1) . . . ji(a, jh) where j1, ..., jh
are the last h successful logins of user a. Then, ji is a
distinguishable feature if |μai - ti| > ksai where k Î ℝ+.
Furthermore, the feature descriptor ba is defined as ba(i)
= 0 if ti > μai + ksai, and 1 if ti < μai - ksai. For other
features, ba is undefined. As distinguishing features ji
develop over time, the login program perturbs the value
in the second column of row i if μai < ti, and vice versa.
The reconstruction of hpwda succeeds only if distin-
guishable features remain consistent. Additionally, if a
subject’s typing patterns change slightly over time, the
system will adapt by conducting a constant-size history
file, encrypted with hpwda, as part of the biometric tem-
plate. In contrast to most BCSs the initial feature
descriptor is created without the use of any helper data.
Proposed schemes: In several publications, Monrose et
al. [18,23,88] apply their password-hardening scheme to
voice biometrics where the representation of the utter-
ance of a data subject is utilized to identify suitable fea-
tures. A FRR of approximately 6% and a FAR below
20% was reported. In further work [25,26] the authors
analyze and mathematically formalize major require-
ments of biometric key generators, and a method to
generate randomized biometric templates is proposed
[89]. Stable features are located during a single registra-
tion procedure in which several biometric inputs are
measured. Chen and Chandran [90] proposed a key-gen-
eration scheme for face biometrics (for 128-bit keys),
which operates like a password-hardening scheme [19],
using Radon transform and an interactive chaotic bis-
pectral one-way transform. Here, Reed-Solomon codes
are used instead of shares. A FRR of 28% and a FAR of
1.22% are reported.
2) BioHashing
A technique applied to face biometrics called “BioHash-
ing” was introduced by Teoh et al. [41,91-93]. Basically,
the BioHashing approach operates as key-binding
scheme, however, to generate biometric hashes secret
user-specific tokens (unlike public helper data) have to
be presented at authentication. Prior to the key-binding
step, secret tokens are blended with biometric data to
derive a distorted biometric template, thus, BioHashing
can be seen as an instance of “Biometric Salting” (see
Section 3).
Operation mode (see Figure 11): The original concept
of BioHashing is summarized in two stages while the
first stage is subdivided in two substages: first the raw
image is transformed to an image representation in log-
polar frequency domain Γ Î ℜM, where M specifies the
log-polar spatial frequency dimension by applying a
wavelet transform, which makes the output immune to
changing facial expressions and small occlusions. Subse-
quently, a Fourier-Mellin transform is applied to achieve
translation, rotation and scale invariance. The generated
face feature Γ Î ℜM is reduced to a set of single bits
b ∈ {0, 1}lb of length lb via a set of uniform distributed
secret random numbers ri Î {-1, 1} which are uniquely
associated with a token. These tokenized random num-
bers, which are created out of a subject’s seed, take on a
central role in the BioHashing algorithm. First the user’s
seed is used for generating a set of random vectors {ri Î
ℜM|i = 1, ..., lb}. Then, the Gram-Schmidt process is
applied to the set of random vectors resulting in a set of
orthonormal vectors {r⊥i ∈ M|i = 1, . . . , lb} . The dot
product of the feature vector and all orthonormal vec-
tors {〈|r⊥i 〉 ∈ M|i = 1, . . . , lb} is calculated. Finally a
lb-bit FaceHash b ∈ {0, 1}lb is calculated, where bi, the i-
th bit of b is 0 if 〈|r⊥i 〉 ≤ τ and 1 otherwise, where τ
is a predefined threshold. In the second stage of Bio-
Hashing a key kc is generated out of the BioHash b.






























































Figure 11 BioHashing: basic operation mode.
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Proposed schemes: Generating FaceHashes, a FRR of
0.93% and a zero FAR are reported. In other approaches
the same group adopts BioHashing to several biometric
characteristics including fingerprints [94,95], iris bio-
metrics [96,97] as well as palmprints [98] and show how
to apply generated hashes in generic key-binding
schemes [99,100]. The authors reported zero EERs for
several schemes.
Kong et al. [101] presented an implementation of
FaceHashing and gave an explanation for the zero EER,
reported in the first works on BioHashing. Zero EER
were achieved due to the tokenized random numbers,
which were assumed to be unique across subjects. In a
more recent publication, Teoh et al. [102] address the
so-called “stolen-token” issue evaluating a variant of
BioHashing, known as multistage random projection
(MRP). By applying a multi-state discretization the fea-
ture element space is divided into 2N segments by
adjusting the user-dependent standard deviation. By
using this method, elements of the extracted feature
vector can render multiple bits instead of 1 bit in the
original BioHash. As a result, the extracted bitstreams
exhibit higher entropy and recognition performance is
increased even if impostors are in possession of valid
tokens. However, zero EERs were not achieved under
the stolen-token scenario. Different improvements to
the BioHashing algorithm have been suggested
[103,104].
3) Multi-BCSs and hybrid-BCSs
While multi-biometric systems [105] have been firmly
established (e.g., combining iris and face in a single sen-
sor scenario) a limited amount of approaches to BCSs
utilize several different biometric traits to generate cryp-
tographic keys. Nandakumar and Jain [106] proposed
the best performing multibiometric cryptosystem in a
fuzzy vault based on fingerprint and iris. The authors
demonstrate that a combination of biometric modalities
leads to increased accuracy and, thus, higher security. A
FRR of 1.8% at a FAR of ~0.01% is obtained, while the
corresponding FRR values of the iris and fingerprint
fuzzy vaults are 12 and 21.2%, respectively. Several other
ideas of using a set of multiple biometric characteristics
within BCSs have been proposed [107-114].
Nagar et al. [17,65] proposed a hybrid fingerprint-
based BCS. Local minutiae descriptors, which comprise
ridge orientations and frequency information, are bound
to ordinate values of a fuzzy vault applying a fuzzy com-
mitment scheme. In experiments FRR of 5% and a FAR
of 0.01% is obtained, without minutiae descriptors the
FAR increased to 0.7%. A similar scheme has been sug-
gested in [115].
4) Other approaches
Chen et al. [116] extract keys from fingerprints and bind
these to coefficients of n-variant linear equations. Any n
(n < m) elements of a m-dimensional feature vector can
retrieve a hidden key where the template consists of
true data, the solution space of the equation, and chaff
data (false solutions of the equation). A FRR of 7.2%
and zero FAR are reported. Bui et al. [117] propose a
key-binding scheme based on face applying quantization
index modulation which is originally targeted for water-
marking applications. In [118,119], approaches of com-
bining biometric templates with syndrome codes based
on the Slepian-Wolf theorem are introduced. Boyen et
al. [120] presented a technique for authenticated key
exchange with the use of biometric data. In order to
extract consistent bits from fingerprints a locality pre-
serving hash is suggested in [121]. Thereby minutiae are
mapped to a vector space of real coefficients which are
decorrelated using PCA. Kholmatov et al. [122] pro-
posed a method for biometric-based secret sharing. A
secret is shared upon several users and released if a suf-
ficiently large number of the user’s biometric traits is
presented at authentication. Similar approaches have
been proposed in [123,124].
E. Security of biometric cryptosystems
Most BCSs aim at binding or generating keys, long
enough to be applied in a generic cryptographic system
(e.g., 128-bit keys for AES). To prevent biometric keys
from being guessed, these need to exhibit sufficient size
and entropy. System performance of BCSs is mostly
reported in terms of FRR and FAR, since both metrics
and key entropy depend on the tolerance levels allowed
at comparison, these three quantities are highly inter-
related.
Buhan et al. [53,125] have shown that there is a direct
relation between the maximum length k of crypto-
graphic keys and the error rates of the biometric system.
The authors define this relation as k ≤ - log2(FAR),
which has established as one of the most common
matrices used to estimate the entropy of biometric keys.
This means that an ideal BCS would have to maintain
an FAR ≤ 2-k which appears to be a quite rigorous
upper bound that may not be achievable in practice.
Nevertheless, the authors pointed out the important fact
that the recognition rates of a biometric system corre-
late with the amount of information which can be
extracted, retaining maximum entropy. Based on their
proposed quantization scheme, [22]. Vielhauer et al.
[126] describe the issue of choosing significant features
of online signatures and introduce three measures for
feature evaluation: intrapersonal feature deviation, inter-
personal entropy of hash value components and the cor-
relation between both. By analyzing the discriminativity
of chosen features the authors show that the applied
feature vector can be reduced by 45% maintaining error
rates [127]. This example underlines the fact that BCSs
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may generate arbitrary long keys while inter-class dis-
tances (= Hamming distance between keys) remain low.
Ballard et al. [25,26] propose a new measure to analyze
the security of a BCS, termed guessing distance. The
guessing distance defines the number of guesses a
potential imposter has to perform in order to retrieve
either the biometric data or the cryptographic key.
Thus, the guessing distance directly relates to intra-class
distances of biometric systems and, therefore, provides a
more realistic measure of the entropy of biometric keys.
Kelkboom et al. [128] analytically obtained a relationship
between the maximum key size and a target system per-
formance. A increase of maximum key size is achieved
in various scenarios, e.g., when applying several bio-
metric templates at enrollment and authentication or
when increasing the desired false rejection rates. In the-
ory-oriented work, Tuyls et al. [129,130] estimate the
capacity and entropy loss for fuzzy commitment
schemes and shielding functions, respectively. Similar
investigations have been done by Li et al. [131,132] who
provide a systematic approach of how to examine the
relative entropy loss of any given scheme, which bounds
the number of additional bits that could be extracted if
optimal parameters were used. A method for arranging
secret points and chaff points in fuzzy vaults such that
entropy loss is minimized is presented in [133].
Obviously, key lengths have to be maximized in order
to minimize the probability that secret keys are guessed
[128]. A second factor which affects the security of bio-
metric cryptosystems is privacy leakage, i.e., the infor-
mation that the helper data contain (leak) about
biometric data [134]. Ideally, privacy leakage should be
minimized (for a given key length), to avoid identity
fraud. The requirements on key size and privacy leakage
define a fundamental trade-off within approaches to
BCSs, which is rarely estimated. In [135] this trade-off is
studied from in an information-theoretical prospective
and achievable key length versus privacy leakage regions
are determined. Additionally, stored helper data have to
provide unlinkability.
3. Cancelable biometrics
Cancelable biometric transforms are designed in a way
that it should be computationally hard to recover the
original biometric data (see Figure 12). The intrinsic
strength (individuality) of biometric characteristics
should not be reduced applying transforms (constraint
on FAR) while on the other hand transforms should be
tolerant to intra-class variation (constraint on FRR) [12].
In addition, correlation of several transformed templates
must not reveal any information about the original bio-
metrics (unlinkability). In case transformed biometric
data are compromised, transform parameters are chan-
ged, i.e., the biometric template is updated. To prevent
impostors from tracking subjects by cross-matching
databases it is suggested to apply different transforms
for different applications. Two main categories of CB
are distinguished [4]:
(1) Non-invertible transforms: In these approaches,
biometric data are transformed applying a noninver-
tible function (e.g., Figure 12b,c). In order to provide
updatable templates, parameters of the applied trans-
forms are modified. The advantage of applying non-
invertible transforms is that potential impostors are
not able to reconstruct the entire biometric data
even if transforms are compromised. However,
applying non-invertible transforms mostly implies a
loss of accuracy. Performance decrease is caused by
the fact that transformed biometric templates are
difficult to align (like in BCSs) in order to perform a
proper comparison and, in addition, information is
reduced. For several approaches these effects have
been observed [12,136].
(2) Biometric salting: Biometric salting usually
denotes transforms of biometric templates which are
selected to be invertible. Any invertible transform of
biometric feature vector elements represents an
approach to biometric salting even if biometric tem-
plates have been extracted in a way that it is not fea-
sible to reconstruct the original biometric signal
[137]. As a consequence, the parameters of the
transform have to be kept secret. In case user-speci-
fic transforms are applied, the parameters of the
transform (which can be seen as a secret seed [102]
have to be presented at each authentication. Impos-
tors may be able to recover the original biometric
template in case transform parameters are compro-
mised, causing a potential performance decrease of
the system in case underlying biometric algorithms
do not provide high accuracy without secret trans-
forms. While approaches to biometric salting may




Figure 12 CB: (a) iris texture, (b) block permutation, (c) surface
folding.
Rathgeb and Uhl EURASIP Journal on Information Security 2011, 2011:3
http://jis.eurasipjournals.com/content/2011/1/3
Page 11 of 25
systems non-invertible transforms provide higher
security [4].
Approaches to CB can be classified further with respect
parts of biometric systems in which transforms are
applied. In the signal domain, transformations are either
applied to raw biometric measurements (e.g., face image
[12]) or to preprocessed biometric signals (e.g., iris tex-
ture [138]). In case transforms are applied in signal
domain comparators do not need to be adapted. In fea-
ture domain extracted biometric features (e.g., face fea-
tures in [102]) are transformed, thus, a compromise of
transforms requires further effort in reconstructing the
original biometric from the template. Experimental
results of key concepts of CB are summarized in Table 4.
A. The issue of performance evaluation
While in the majority of proposed approaches to CB
template alignment is non-trivial and applied transforms
are selected to be non-invertible, still some schemes (e.
g., in [72,102]), especially to biometric salting, report an
increase in performance. In case user-specific transforms
are applied at enrollment and authentication, by defini-
tion, two-factor authentication is yielded which may
increase the security but does not effect the accuracy of
biometric authentication.
A significant increase of recognition rates can be
caused by unpractical assumptions during performance
evaluations. If user-specific transforms are applied to
achieve CB these transforms have to be considered com-
promised during inter-class comparisons. Otherwise, bio-
metrics becomes meaningless as the system could rely on
secret tokens parameters without any risk [101]. Secret
tokens, be it transform parameters, random numbers or
any kind of passwords are easily compromised and must
not be considered secure [1]. Thus, performance evalua-
tions of approaches to CB have to be performed under
the so-called “stolen-token scenario” where each impostor
is in possession of valid secret tokens (the same applies
to BCSs in case secret tokens are applied). Figure 13
illustrates how inter-class distances may change with or
without considering the stolen-token scenario. If different
tokens are applied for each subject a clear separation of
intra-class and inter-class distributions is achieved by
adopting a new threshold. In contrast, if secret tokens are
considered compromised accuracy decreases. Perfor-
mance is untruly gained if this scenario is ignored during
experiments causing even more vulnerable systems in
case of compromise [139].
B. Approaches to non-invertible transforms
1) IBM approaches
Ratha et al. [12] were the first to introduce the concept
of CB applying noninvertible transforms.
Operation mode (see Figure 14): Generally, at enroll-
ment, non-invertible transforms are applied to biometric
inputs choosing application-dependent parameters.
During authentication, biometric inputs are transfor-
med and a comparison of transformed templates is
performed.
Several types of transforms for constructing multiple
CB from pre-aligned fingerprints and face biometrics
Table 4 Experimental results of proposed approaches to
CB.
Authors Char. FRR/FAR Remarks
Non-invertible transforms
Ratha et al. [140] 15/10- 4 -
Fingerprint
Boult et al. [147] ~0.08 EER -
Hammerle-Uhl et al. [138] 1.3 EER -
Iris
Zuo et al. [136] 0.005/0 perf. increase
Maiorana et al. [146] Online Sig. 10.81 EER -
Biometric salting
Savvides et al. [137] 4.64/0 Non-stolen token
Teoh et al. [91] Face 2·10 - 3 EER Non-stolen token
Wang et al. [157] 6.68 EER -
Zuo et al. [136] 0.005/<10 - 3 perf. increase
Iris
Ouda et al. [159] 1.3 EER -
Teoh et al. [151] Fingerprint 5.31 EER -
Other CB
Jeong et al. [161] Face 14 EER -
Tulyakov et al. [162] 25.9/0 -
Fingerprint






























Figure 13 The stolen-token scenario for cancelable biometrics.
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have been introduced in [12,140,141] including cartesian
transform and functional transform. In further work
[136], different techniques to create cancelable iris bio-
metrics have been proposed. The authors suggest four
different transforms applied in image and feature domain
where only small performance drops are reported. Ham-
merle-Uhl et al. [138] applied classic transformations sug-
gested in [12] to iris biometrics. Furthermore, in [142] it
is shown that applying both transforms to rectangular iris
images, prior to preprocessing, does not work. Similar to
[136] Rathgeb and Uhl [143] suggest to apply row per-
mutations to iris-codes. Maiorana et al. [144-146] apply
non-invertible transforms to obtain cancelable templates
from online signatures. In their approach, biometric tem-
plates, which represent a set of temporal sequences, are
split into non-overlapping sequences of signature features
according to a random vector which provides revocability.
Subsequently, the transformed template is generated
through linear convolution of sequences. The complexity
of reconstructing the original data from the transformed
template is computationally as hard as random guessing.
2) Revocable biotokens
Boult et al. [147,148] proposed cryptographically secure
biotokens which they applied to face and fingerprints. In
order to enhance security in biometric systems, bioto-
kens, which they refer to as Biotope™, are adopted to
existing recognition schemes (e.g., PCA for face).
Operation mode (see Figure 15): Each measured bio-
metric feature v is transformed via scaling and transla-
tion resulting in v’ = (v - t) · s. The key idea is to split v’
into a stable part g termed integer and an unstable part
r. For face biometrics the authors suggest to simply split
real feature values into an integer part and a fractional
part (e.g., 15.4 is splitted into 15 and 0.4). Since g is
considered stable, and a “perfect matching” is claimed to
be feasible at authentication, comparisons can be per-
formed in the encrypted domain. A one-way transform
of g, denoted by w is stored as first part of the secure
biometric template. As second part of the template the
unencoded r which has been obscured via the transform,
as well as s and t are stored. At authentication, features
are transformed applying s and t onto a residual region
defined by r. Then, the unencrypted r is used to com-
pute the local distance within a “window”, which is
referred to as robust distance measure, to provide a per-
fect match of w. However, since a perfect match is
required only for a number of features defined by the
system threshold, biotokens are not matched exactly.
Additionally, user-specific passcodes can be incorpo-
rated to create verification-only systems. Although the
authors ideas seem promising, several questions with
respect to the presented approaches are left open, for
instance, the design of the helper function which sepa-
rates biometric features into stable and unstable parts
and the adoption of this scheme to other biometric
characteristics (which is claimed to be feasible). In
further work, bipartite biotokens [149,150] are intro-
duced and applied to fingerprints in order to provide
secure communication via an untrusted channel, where
cryptographic keys are released based on successful
comparisons of biotokens.
C. Approaches to biometric salting
Savvides et al. [137] generate cancelable face biometrics
by applying so-called minimum average correlation filters
which provide non-invertibility. User-specific secret per-
sonal identification numbers (PINs) serve as seed for a
random basis for the filters similar to [31]. As previously
mentioned, BioHashing [41] without key-binding provides
cancelable biometric templates, too. Early proposals of
the BioHashing algorithm did not consider the stolen-
token scenario. In more recent work [151] it is demon-
strated that the EER for the extraction of cancelable
180-bit fingercodes increases from 0% to 5.31% in the
stolen-token scenario. The authors address this issue by
proposing a new method which they refer to as MRP
[152,153]. It is claimed that MRP (which is applied to
face and speech) retains recognition performance in the
stolen-token scenario. Furthermore, the authors proposed
a method to generate cancelable keys out of dynamic
hand signatures [154,155] based on the random mixing
























































Figure 15 Biotokens: basic operation mode.
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provide CB, extracted features are randomly mixed with a
token T using a BioPhasor mixing method. Kim et al.
[156] apply user-specific random projections to PCA-
based face features followed by an error minimizing tem-
plate transform. However, the authors do not consider a
stolen-token scenario. Another approach to biometric
salting was presented by Wang et al. [157] in which face
features are transformed based on a secret key. Non-
invertibility is achieved by means of quantization. Ouda
et al. [158,159] propose a technique to obtain cancelable
iris-codes. Out of several enrollment templates a vector
of consistent bits (BioCode) and their positions are
extracted. Revocability is provided by encoding the Bio-
Code according to a selected random seed. Pillai et al.
[160] achieve cancelable iris templates by applying sector
random projection to iris images. Recognition perfor-
mance is only maintained if user-specific random
matrices are applied.
D. Further investigations on cancelable biometrics
Jeong et al. [161] combine two different feature extrac-
tion methods to achieve cancelable face biometrics. PCA
and ICA (independent component analysis) coefficients
are extracted and both feature vectors are randomly
scrambled and added in order to create a transformed
template. Tulyakov et al. [162,163] propose a method
for generating cancelable fingerprint hashes. Instead of
aligning fingerprint minutiae, the authors apply order
invariant hash functions, i.e., symmetric complex hash
functions. Ang et al. [164] suggest to apply a key-depen-
dent geometric transform to fingerprints. In the first
step a core point is selected in the fingerprint image
and a line is drawn through it where the secret key
defines the angle of the line (0 ≤ key ≤ π). Secondly, all
minutiae below the line are reflected above the line to
achieve a transformed template. Yang et al. [165] apply
random projections to minutiae quadruples to obtain
cancelable fingerprint templates. In further work [166]
the authors address the stolen-token scenario by select-
ing random projection matrices based on biometric fea-
tures. Lee et al. [167] presented a method for generating
alignment-free cancelable fingerprint templates. Similar
to [59,162,163], orientation information is used for each
minutiae point. Cancelability is provided by a user’s PIN
and the user-specific random vector is used to extract
translation and rotation invariant values of minutiae
points. Hirata and Takahashi [168] propose CB for fin-
ger-vain patterns where images are transformed applying
a Fourier-like transform. The result is then multiplied
with a random filter where the client stores the inverse
filter on some token. At authentication the inverse filter
is applied to regenerate the transformed enrollment data
and correlation-based comparison is performed. A simi-
lar scheme is applied to fingerprints in [169]. Bringer et
al. [170] presented an idea of generating time-dependent
CB to achieve untraceability among different identities
across time.
E. Security of cancelable biometrics
While in the vast majority of approaches, security is put
on a level with obtained recognition accuracy according
to a reference system, analysis with respect to irreversi-
bility and unlinkability is rarely done. According to irre-
versibility, i.e., the possibility of inverting applied
transforms to obtain the original biometric template,
applied feature transformations have to be analyzed in
detail. For instance, if (invertible) block permutation of
biometric data (e.g., fingerprints in [140] or iris in [138])
is utilized to generate cancelable templates the computa-
tional effort of reconstructing (parts of) the original bio-
metric data has to be estimated. While for some
approaches, analysis of irreversibility appear straight for-
ward for others more sophisticated studies are required
(e.g., in [145] irreversibility relies on the difficulty in sol-
ving a blind deconvolution problem).
In order to provide renewability of protected bio-
metric templates, applied feature transformations are
performed based on distinct parameters, i.e., employed
parameters define a finite key space (which is rarely
reported). In general, protected templates differ more as
more distant the respective transformation parameters
are [146]. To satisfy the property of unlinkability, differ-
ent transformed templates, generated from a single bio-
metric template applying different parameters, have to
appear random to themselves (like templates of different
subjects), i.e., the amount of applicable parameters (key
space) is limited by the requirement of unlinkability.
F. Cancelable biometrics versus biometric cryptosystems
The demand for cancelable biometric keys results in a
strong interrelation between the technologies of BCSs
and CB [8]. Within common key-binding schemes in
which chosen keys are bound to biometric templates,
keys are updatable by definition. In most cases, revoking
keys require re-enrollment (original biometric templates
are discarded after enrollment). In case a key-binding
system can be run in secure sketch mode (e.g., [15,16]),
original biometric templates can be reconstructed from
another biometric input. With respect to key-generation
schemes, revoking extracted keys require more effort. If
keys are extracted directly from biometric features with-
out the application of any helper data (e.g., as suggested
in [76]), an update of the key is not feasible. Within
helper data-based key-generation schemes stored helper
data has to be modified in a way that extracted keys are
different from previous ones (e.g., changing the encod-
ing of intervals in quantization schemes). Alternatively,
the key-generation process could comprise an additional
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stage in which biometric salting performed prior to the
key-generation process [171,172]. In [173] it is suggested
to combine a secure sketch with cancelable fingerprint
templates. While CB protect the representation of the
biometric data, the biometric template is reconstructed
from the stored helper data. Several other approaches to
generating cancelable biometric keys have been pro-
posed in [174-177].
4. Discussion and outlook
Based on the presented key concepts of BCSs and CB a
concluding discussion is done, including advantages and
applications, potential attacks to both technologies, the
current state-of-the-art, commercial vendors, and open
issues and challenges.
A. Advantages and applications
BCSs and CB offer several advantages over generic bio-
metric systems. Most important advantages are summar-
ized in Table 5. In order to underline the potential of
both technologies, two essential use cases are discussed.
1) Encryption/decryption with biometric keys
The most apparent application of BCSs is biometric-
dependent key-release within conventional cryptosystems,
replacing insecure password- or PIN-based key-release
[8]. Eliminating this weak link within cryptosystems, bio-
metric-dependent key-release results in substantial secur-
ity benefits making cryptographic systems more suitable
for high security applications.
Operation mode (see Figure 16): Any subject regis-
tered with the BCS is able to release cryptographic keys
upon presenting biometric characteristics. Biometric-
dependent keys are then transferred to the applied cryp-
tographic algorithm to encrypt plain data. While several
approaches to BCSs fulfill the requirement of generating
sufficiently long cryptographic keys to be used in sym-
metric cryptosystems, most schemes fail in extracting an
adequate amount of information to construct public key
infrastructures (with few exceptions, e.g., [178]). Subse-
quently, encrypted data are transmitted via any
untrusted channel. To decrypt the cipher text again, bio-
metrics are presented to release decrypting keys. It is
important to point out that by using biometric keys in
generic cryptosystems the generated cipher text is not
harder to decipher (in fact it will be even easier to deci-
pher since biometric keys often suffer from low
entropy).
2) Pseudonymous biometric databases
BCSs and CB meet the requirements of launching
pseudonymous biometric databases [9] since both tech-
nologies provide biometric comparisons in encrypted
domain while stored helper data or transformed
templates do not reveal significant information about
original biometric templates.
Operation mode (see Figure 17): At enrollment, bio-
metric characteristics of a subject are employed as input
for a BCS or CB (as suggested in [12] diverse obscured
templates are generated for different databases).
Depending on the type of application further encrypted
records are linked to the template where decryption
could be applied based on biometric-dependent keys.
Since biometric templates are not exposed during com-
parisons [4], the authentication process is fully pseudon-
ymous and, furthermore, the activities of any subject are
untraceable.
Several other applications for the use of BCSs and CB
have been suggested. In [10], biometric ticketing, consu-
mer biometric payment systems and biometric boarding
cards are suggested. VoIP packages are encrypted apply-
ing biometric keys in [179]. A remote biometric authen-
tication scheme on mobile devices based on biometric
keys is proposed in [180] and a framework for an alter-
native PIN service based on CB is presented in [181]. In
[182], helper data-free key-generation is utilized for
biometric database hashing. Privacy preserving video
surveillance has been proposed in [183].
Table 5 Major advantages of BCS and CB.
Advantage Description
Template protection Within BCSs and CB the original biometric template is obscured such that a reconstruction is hardly feasible.
Secure key release BCSs provide key release mechanisms based on biometrics.
Pseudonymous Auth. Authentication is performed in the encrypted domain and, thus, is pseudonymous.
Revocability of templates Several instances of secured templates can be generated.
Increased security BCSs and CB prevent from several traditional attacks against biometric systems.




























Figure 16 Encryption and decryption of information with keys
of BCSs.
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B. Potential attacks
Several attacks have been encountered to infiltrate con-
ventional biometric systems [4,184]. The technologies of
BCS and CB prevent from different traditional attacks
while they appear still vulnerable to some. The most
common points of attacks to a biometric system are
shown in Figure 18. In addition, numerous techniques
have been especially designed to attack key approaches
to BCSs and CB.
BCSs and CB do not prevent from classic spoofing
attacks [184] (presenting fake physical biometrics). How-
ever, there are other possibilities to detect fake bio-
metric inputs (e.g., liveness detection [185]) which can
be integrated in both technologies, the same holds for
replay attacks. Performing substitution attacks to BCSs
is more difficult compared to conventional biometric
systems since biometric templates are either bound to
cryptographic keys or used to extract helper data (the
original biometric template is discarded). Substitution
attacks against BCSs require additional knowledge (e.g.,
of bound keys in case of key-binding schemes). In case
of CB substitution, attacks are feasible if impostors are
in possession of secret transform parameters or secret
keys within approaches to biometric salting. Both tech-
nologies are more resilient to masquerade attacks
[10,186]. Since reconstruction of original biometric tem-
plates should not be feasible the synthetization of origi-
nal biometric inputs is highly complicated (e.g., [187]).
Performance rates of both technologies decrease com-
pared to conventional biometric systems which makes
BCSs and CB even more vulnerable to false acceptance
attacks. In contrast to CB, overriding final yes/no
responses in a tampering scenario is hardly feasible
within BCSs as these return a key instead of binary deci-
sions (intermediate score-based attacks could still be
applied [188]).
In Table 6 an overview of specific attacks proposed
against BCSs and CB technologies is given.
1) Attacks against BCSs
Boyen [189] was the first to point out the vulnerability
of secure sketches and fuzzy extractors in case an
impostor is in possession of multiple invocations of the
same secret which are combined to reconstruct secrets
and, furthermore, retrieve biometric templates. This
(rather realistic) scenario is considered as basis for sev-
eral attacks against BCSs and CB. Similar observations
have been made by Sceirer and Boult [190] which refer
to this attack as “attack via record multiplicity”. More-
over, the authors point out that if the attacker has
knowledge of the secret, the template can be recovered.
In addition, a blended substitution attack is introduced
in which a subjects and the attackers template are
merged into one single template used to authenticate
with the system. The Biometric Encryption™algorithm
[20] is highly impacted or even compromised by these
attacks. Adler [187] proposed a “hill-climbing” attack
against the Biometric Encryption™algorithm in which a
sample biometric input is iteratively modified while the
internal comparison score is observed. Nearest impostor
attacks [188] in which distinct parts of a large set of bio-
metric templates is combined to obtain high match
scores could be applied even more effectively.
Keys bound in fuzzy commitment schemes [15] have
been found to suffer from low entropy (e.g., 44 bits in
[32]) reducing the complexity for brute force attacks
[40]. Attacks which utilize the fact that error correction
codes underlie distinct structures have been suggested
[10,188]. Attacks based on error correction code histo-
grams have been successfully conducted against iris-
based fuzzy commitment schemes in [191]. In [134],
privacy and security leakages of fuzzy commitment
schemes are investigated for several biometric data sta-
tistics. It is found that fuzzy commitment schemes leak
information in bound keys and non-uniform templates.
Suggestions to prevent from information leakage in
fuzzy commitment schemes have been proposed in
[192]. In addition, attacks via record multiplicity could
be applied to decode stored commitments [193,194].
Kelkboom et al. [195] introduce a bit-permutation pro-
cess to prevent from this attack in a fingerprint-based
fuzzy commitment scheme. In addition, it has been
found that a permutation of binary biometric feature
vectors improves the performance of fuzzy commitment
scheme [34], i.e., not only the entropy of the entire bio-
metric template (which is commonly estimated in
“degrees-of-freedom” [196]) but the distribution of
Database
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Figure 18 Potential points of attack in generic biometric
systems.
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entropy across feature vectors contributes to the security
of the system. As a successive encoding of chunks of
biometric templates is essential to bind sufficiently long
keys distinct parts of the commitment may suffer from
low entropy and, thus, are easily decoded [188], i.e., an
adaption of biometric templates (e.g., [195]) or an
improved use of error correction (e.g., [48]) is necessary.
Applying shielding functions to fingerprints, Buhan et
al. [197] estimate the probability of identifying protected
templates across databases. It is demonstrated that any
kind of quantization approaches do not meet the
requirement of unlinkability in general.
Against fuzzy vaults [16], several attacks have been
discovered. Chang et al. [198] present an observation to
distinguish minutiae from chaff points attacking fuzzy
vaults based on fingerprints. Since chaff points are cre-
ated one-by-one, those created later tend reveal smaller
empty surrounding areas which is verified experimen-
tally, i.e., the security of a fuzzy vault highly relies on
the methodology of generating chaff points. Scheirer
and Boult [190] introduce an attack via record multipli-
city. If more instances of a fuzzy vault (generated using
different keys) are obtained minutiae are likely recover-
able, i.e., unlinkability represents a major issue con-
structing fuzzy vaults. A method for inserting chaff
points with a minimal entropy loss has been proposed
in [133]. A brute force attack against fuzzy vaults was
proposed in [199]. A collusion attack where the attacker
is assumed to be in possession of multiple vaults locked
by the same key is presented in [200]. It is demonstrated
how to effectively identify chaff points which are subse-
quently remove to unlock the vault. In [201], vulnerabil-
ities within the concept of a hardened fuzzy vaults are
pointed out. In contrast to other concepts (e.g., the
fuzzy commitment scheme) the fuzzy vault scheme does
not obscure the original biometric template but hides it
by adding chaff points, i.e., helper data comprise original
biometric features (e.g., minutiae) in plain form. Even if
practical key retrieval rates are provided by proposed
systems, impostors may still be able to unlock vaults in
case the helper data does not hide the original biometric
template properly, especially if attackers are in posses-
sion of several instances of a single vault.
Helper data-based key-generation schemes [77,126]
appear to be vulnerable to attack via record multiplicity.
If an attacker is in possession of several different types
of helper data and valid secret keys of the same user, a
correlation of these can be utilized to reconstruct an
approximation of biometric templates acquired at
enrollment. In addition, key-generation schemes tend to
extract short keys which makes them easier to be
guessed in brute force attacks within a realistic feature
space. Methods to reconstruct raw biometric data from
biometric hashes have been proposed in [202]. Since
key-generation schemes tend to reveal worse accuracy
compared to key-binding approaches (unless a large
number of enrollment samples are applied) these are
expected to be highly vulnerable to false acceptance
attacks.
The password-hardening scheme [19] has been
exposed to be vulnerable to power consumption obser-
vations. Side channel attacks to a key generator for
voice [18,23] were performed in [203]. Demonstrating
another way of attacking biometric key generators, toler-
ance functions were identified, which either decide to
authorize or reject a user. Another side channel attack
to a BCS based on keystroke dynamics was presented in
[204]. It is suggested to add noise and random bit-
masks to stored parts of the template in order to reduce
the correlation between the original biometric template
and the applied key. A similar attack to initial steps of
error correction decoding in BCSs is proposed in [205].
2) Attacks against CB
The aim of attacking CB systems is to expose the secret
transform (and parameters) applied to biometric tem-
plates. Thereby potential attackers are able to apply sub-
stitution attacks. If transforms are considered invertible,
original biometric templates may be reconstructed. In
case of non-invertible transforms, attackers may recon-
struct an approximation of the original biometric
Table 6 Potential attacks against BCS and CB.
Technology Proposed attack(s)
Biometric cryptosystems
Biometric encryption™[20] Blended substitution attack, attack via record multiplicity, masquerade attack (hill climbing)
Fuzzy commitment scheme [15] Attacks on error correcting codes
Shielding functions [51] Attack via record multiplicity
Fuzzy vault scheme [16] Blended substitution attack, attack via record multiplicity, chaff elimination
Key-Gen. Schemes [77,126] False acceptance attack, masquerade attack, brute force attack
Biometric hardend passwords [19] Power consumption observation
Cancelable Biometrics
Non-invertible transforms [12] Overwriting final decision, Attack via Record Multiplicity, Substitution Attack (known Transform)
Biometric salting [41] Overwriting final decision, with Stolen Token: False Acceptance Attack, Substitution Attack, Masquerade Attack
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template. Comparison scores, calculated in encrypted
domain, could be overwritten [184] and hill-climbing
attacks [186] could be performed. In [206,207], attacks
against the block re-mapping and surface-folding algo-
rithm of [12] based on fingerprints are proposed.
Since most approaches to biometric salting become
highly vulnerable in case secret tokens are stolen [101],
false accept attacks could be effectively applied. If the
salting process is invertible, templates may be recon-
structed and applied in masquerade attacks. Approaches
to biometric salting which do not comprise a key-bind-
ing step are vulnerable to overwriting final decisions.
Several vulnerabilities in the original concept of the Bio-
Hashing algorithm [41] have been encountered in [103].
The main drawback of BioHashing (and other instances
of biometric salting) resides in exhibiting low perfor-
mance in case attackers are in possession of secret
tokens.
C. Privacy aspects
Subjects can no longer be trusted based on credentials;
however, credentials can be revoked and reissued. In
order to abolish credential-based authentication, bio-
metrics are increasingly applied for authentication pur-
poses in a broad variety of commercial (e.g., fingerprint
door locks) and institutional applications (e.g., border
control). Therefore, biometric authentication requires
more stringent techniques to identify registered subjects
[208]. Besides the fact that subjects share biometric
traits rather reluctantly, the common use of biometrics
is often considered as a threat to privacy [209]. Most
common concerns include abuse of biometric data (e.g.,
intrusion by creating physical spoofs) as well as perma-
nent tracking and observation of activities (e.g., function
creep by cross-matching).
BCSs and CB are expected to increase the confidence
in biometric authentication systems (trusted identifica-
tion). Both technologies permanently protect biometric
templates against unauthorized access or disclosure by
providing biometric comparisons in the encrypted
domain, preserving the privacy of biometric characteris-
tics [8,27]. BCSs and CB keep biometric templates confi-
dential meeting security requirements of irreversibility,
and unlinkability.
D. The state-of-the-art
The state-of-the-art of BCSs and CB is estimated
according to several magnitudes, i.e., reported perfor-
mance rates, biometric modalities, applied test sets, etc.,
and the best performing and evaluated approaches are
compared and summarized.
In early approaches to BCSs [31,77], performance
rates were omitted. Moreover, most of these schemes
have been found to suffer from serious security
vulnerabilities [8,190]. Representing one of the simplest
key-binding approaches the fuzzy commitment scheme
[15] has been successfully applied to iris [32] (and other
biometrics). Iris-codes appear to exhibit sufficient infor-
mation to bind and retrieve long cryptographic keys.
Shielding functions [51] and quantization scheme
[22,82] have been applied to several physiological and
behavioral biometrics, while focusing on reported per-
formance rates, these schemes require further studies.
The fuzzy vault scheme [16] which represents one of
the most popular BCS has frequently been applied to
fingerprints. Early approaches [55], which required a
pre-alignment of biometric templates, have demon-
strated the potential of this concept. Recently, several
techniques [56,57] to overcome the shortcoming of pre-
alignment have been proposed. In addition, the feature
of order-invariance offers solutions to implement appli-
cations such as biometric-based secret sharing in a
secure manner [122]. Within the BioHashing approach
[41], biometric features are projected onto secret
domains applying user-specific tokens prior to a key-
binding process. Variants of the BioHashing approach
have been exposed to reveal unpractical performance
rates under the non-stolen-token scenario [101]. While
generic BCSs are designed to extract or bind keys from
or to a biometric the password-hardening scheme [19]
aims at “salting” an existing password with biometric
features.
An overview of key approaches of BCSs, with respect
biometric characteristics, applied data sets etc., is given
in Table 7. Best results are achieved for fingerprints and
iris (e.g., in [32,56]). Both characteristics seem to pro-
vide enough information to release sufficiently long keys
at practical performance rates while an alignment of
templates is feasible. In [32] a FRR of 0.42% at zero FAR
is achieved for the first iris-based fuzzy commitment
scheme. Performance rates decrease applying scheme to
larger datasets captured under unfavorable conditions
[34]. Focusing on fingerprints the first implementations
of fuzzy vaults [55] have been significantly improved. In
[56] a FRR of 4.0% is achieved at a negligible FAR with-
out pre-alignment. Multi-biometric schemes [106] were
found improve accuracy even for binding rather long
keys. Quantization schemes, which are mostly applied to
behavioral biometric characteristics, are limited to gen-
erating rather short keys or hashes (e.g., 24 bits in [22])
while performance rates are found unpractical (e.g., FRR
of 28.0% in [21]). With respect to recognition rates, the
vast majority of BCSs are by no means comparable to
conventional biometric systems. While numerous
approaches to BCSs generate too short keys at unaccep-
table performance rates, several enrollment samples may
be required as well, (e.g., four samples in [55]).
Approaches which report practical rates are tested on
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rather small datasets (e.g., 70 persons in [32]) which
must not be interpreted as significant. The introduction
of additional tokens, be it random numbers or secret
PINs, often clouds the picture of reported results (e.g.,
zero EER in [92]).
Cancelable biometrics schemes are summarized in
Table 8. First approaches to non-invertible transforms
[12], which have been applied to face and fingerprints,
include block permutation and surface folding. Diverse
proposals [136,138] have shown that recognition perfor-
mance decreases noticeably compared to original bio-
metric systems while sample images of transformed
biometric images render non-invertibility doubtable.
Within the biotoken approach [147] a performance
increase is claimed to be achieved due to the application
of the robust distance measure. An EER of ~ 0.08%
showed an improvement of ~ 36% compared to the ori-
ginal system (this is likely the only approach to CB that
claims to perform better in transformed domain).
BioHashing [41] (without key-binding) represents the
most popular instance of biometric salting which repre-
sents a two-factor authentication scheme [139]. Since
additional tokens have to be kept secret [137,157] result
reporting turns out to be problematic. Perfect recogni-
tion rates have been reported (e.g., in [91]) while the
opposite is true [101].
E. Deployments of BCSs and CB
Though BCSs and CB are still in statu nascendi, first
deployments are already available.
priv-IDa, an independent company that was once
part of Philips specializes in biometric encryption. By
applying a one-way function, which is referred to as
BioHASH®, to biometric data pseudonymous codes are
obtained. PerSayb, a company that provides voice bio-
metric speaker verification collaborates with priv-ID to
integrate priv-ID engine to voice biometrics. Genkeyc, a
Norway company (which has a large deployment in
Table 7 Summarized experimental results of key approaches to BCSs.
Author(s) Applied scheme Char. FRR/FAR (%) Data Set Key Length Remarks
Hao et al. [32] 0.42/0.0 70 subjects 140-bit -
Fuzzy commitment Iris
Bringer et al. [33] 5.62/0.0 ICE 2005 (244 subjects) 40-bit -
pre-alignment,
Clancy et al. [55] 20-30/0.0 not given 224-bit >1 enroll sam.
Fingerprints
Nandakumar et al. [56] Fuzzy vault 4.0/0.004 FVC2002-DB2 (110 subjects) 128-bit >1 enroll sam.
Iris 5.5/0.0 CASIA v1 (108 subjects) 256-bit -
Wu et al. [68,70]
Palmprint 0.73/0.0 PolyU DB (386 subjects) 292-bit -
Feng and Wah [21] 28.0/1.2 750 subjects 40-bit
Quantization Online signature >1 enroll sam.
Vielhauer et al. [22] 7.05/0.0 10 subjects 24-bit
Monrose et al. [23] Password-hardening Voice >2.0/2.0 90 subjects ~ 60-bit -
Teoh et al. [92] BioHashing Face 0.0/0.0 ORL-DB/Faces94 (194 subjects) 80-bit Non-stolen token
Multibiometric Fingerprint MSU-DBI and
Nandakumar et al. [106] 1.8/0.01 224 bits -
Fuzzy Vault and Iris CASIA v1 (108 subjects)
Table 8 Summarized experimental results of key approaches to CB.
Author(s) Technique Char. Performance Data Set Remarks
Block permutation, FRRs: ~35, ~15, ~15
Ratha et al. [140] 188 subjects -
Radial transform, surface folding Fingerprints (FARs: 10-4)
Boult et al. [147] Revocable BioTokens ~ 0.08 EER FVC 2004 (200 subjects) -
Maiorana et al. [146] BioConvolving Online Sig. 10.81 EER MYCT (330 subjects) -
Teoh et al. [91] BioHashing Face 0.0002 EER ORL-DB/Faces94 (194 subjects) Non-stolen token
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New Delhi), offers solutions to fingerprint-based key-
generation. The company utilized a concept, which is
referred to as FlexKey, where several enrollment samples
are applied to select only the most discriminating
features in order to extract longer keys. Precise Biome-
tricsTMd is a Swedish company which offers solutions to
secure match-on-card fingerprint verification. Securics:
The science of securityTMe, founded by T. Boult, provide
revocable biometric tokens based on the BioToken
approach [147].
The EU project TURBINE [210] which aims to trans-
form a description of fingerprints through cryptobio-
metrics techniques received a EU funding of over $9
million.
F. Open issues and challenges
With respect to the design goals, BCSs and CB offer sig-
nificant advantages to enhance the privacy and security
of biometric systems, providing reliable biometric
authentication at an high security level. Techniques
which provide provable security/privacy, while achieving
practical recognition rates, have remained elusive (even
on small datasets). Additionally, several new issues and
challenges arise deploying these technologies [10]. One
fundamental challenge, regarding both technologies,
represents the issue of alignment, which significantly
effects recognition performance. Biometric templates are
obscured within both technologies, i.e., alignment of
obscured templates without leakage is highly non-trivial.
While for some biometric characteristics (e.g., iris) align-
ment is still feasible, for others (e.g., fingerprints) addi-
tional information, which must not lead to template
reconstruction, has to be stored. Within conventional
biometric systems, align-invariant approaches have been
proposed for several biometric characteristics. So far,
hardly any suggestions have been made to construct
align-invariant BCSs or CB. Feature adaptation schemes
that preserve accuracy have to be utilized in order to
obtain common representations of arbitrary biometric
characteristics (several approaches to extract binary fin-
gerprint templates have been proposed, e.g., [211,212])
allowing biometric fusion in a form suitable for distinct
template protection schemes. In addition, several sug-
gestions for protocols providing provable secure bio-
metric authentication based on template protection
schemes have been made [150,192,213,214].
Focusing on BCSs it is not actually clear which bio-
metric characteristics to apply in which type of applica-
tion. In fact it has been shown that iris or fingerprints
exhibit enough reliable information to bind or extract
sufficiently long keys providing acceptable trade-offs
between accuracy and security, where the best perform-
ing schemes are based on fuzzy commitment and fuzzy
vault. However, practical error correction codes are
designed for communication and data storage purposes
such that a perfect error correction code for a desired
code length has remained evasive (optimal codes exist
only theoretically under certain assumptions [215]). In
addition, a technique to generate chaff points that are
indistinguishable from genuine points has not yet been
proposed. The fact that false rejection rates are lower
bounded by error correction capacities [216] emerges a
great challenge since unbounded use of error correction
(if applicable) makes the system even more vulnerable
[188]. Other characteristics such as voice or keystroke
dynamics (especially behavioral characteristics) were
found to reveal only a small amount of stable informa-
tion [18,19], but can still be applied to improve the
security of an existing secret. In addition, several charac-
teristics can be combined to construct multi-BCSs [107],
which have received only little consideration so far.
Thereby security is enhanced and feature vectors can be
merged to extract enough reliable data. While for some
characteristics, extracting of a sufficient amount of reli-
able features seems to be feasible it still remains ques-
tionable if these features exhibit enough entropy. In case
extracted features do not meet requirements of discrimi-
nativity, systems become vulnerable to several attacks (e.
g., false acceptance attacks). In addition, stability of bio-
metric features is required to limit information leakage
of stored helper data. Besides, several specific attacks to
BCSs have been proposed. While key approaches have
already been exposed to fail high security demands,
more sophisticated security studies for all approaches
are required since claimed security of these technologies
remains unclear due to a lack formal security proofs
and rigorous security formulations [135]. Due to the
sensitivity of BCSs, more user-cooperation (compared to
conventional biometric systems) or multiple enrollment
samples [216] are demanded in order to decrease intra-
class variation, while sensoring and preprocessing
require improvement as well.
Cancelable biometrics require further investigations as
well. Transformations and alignment of transformed
templates have to be optimized in order to maintain the
recognition performance of biometric systems. Addition-
ally, result reporting remains an issue since unrealistic
preconditions distort performance rates.
As plenty different approaches to BCSs and CB have
been proposed a large number of pseudonyms and acro-
nyms have been dispersed across literature such that
attempts to represented biometric template protection
schemes in unified architectures have been made [217].
In addition, a standardization on biometric template
protection is currently under work in ISO/IEC FCD
24745.
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